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Postpartum Psychosis: A New Defense?
If Rhett had understood the changes we mothers go through
after having a baby, perhaps he would not have left Scarlett.
-a mother from Ohio, 19841

I. Introduction
Most people find it difficult to believe that a mother would deliberately hurt or kill her child. "Mothers in our society simply do
not kill their children unless they are seriously disturbed individuals,
usually psychotic." 2 Yet women have committed this terrible act.'
Recently, some women who have killed their infant children have
claimed to be victims of a temporary mental illness known as "postpartum psychosis." '4 This illness affects women in approximately one
out of every 1000 births. 5 Almost invariably, these women have no
history of criminal conduct or serious mental illness.6 In recent
years, women who have attempted to use this syndrome as a criminal
defense have had mixed success.

This Comment examines the use of postpartum psychosis as a
defense to the crime of infanticide.8 It also explores the availability
of the various types of insanity defenses in cases involving postpar-

tum psychosis.' Further, this Comment examines the applicability of
the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict in these cases,' 0 and the possibility of using postpartum psychosis as evidence of diminished capacI. C. Dix. THE NEW MOTHER SYNDROME xix (1985).
2. S. RAGUSEA. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT at 9, Commonwealth v. Comitz, 365
Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987) (prepared for consideration at Sharon Comitz's sentencing hearing Oct. 15, 1985) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
3. See infra notes 39-90 and accompanying text.
4. For a general definition of postpartum psychosis, see infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
5. Fenly, Postpartum Psychosis, Illness Can Trigger Deadly Consequences, The San
Diego Union, Aug. I1, 1986, at CI, col. I.
6. See Pehrson, The Darkest Side of Postpartum Depression, York (PA) Sunday News,
May 31, 1987, at E3, col. 3.
7. In Pennsylvania, no woman charged with the death of her infant child has ever been
acquitted by reason of insanity as a result of postpartum psychosis. Russell, Guilty or Innocent? Postpartum Insanity a Troubling Defense, Pa. L.J. Rep., Feb. 27, 1989, at 12, col. 2.
Women in Vermont, California, and New York have had more success. See infra notes 56-75
and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 91-112 and accompanying text. Infanticide is defined as "[tlhe murder or killing of an infant soon after its birth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (5th ed. 1979).
9. See infra notes 113-94 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
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ity. 11 Finally, the Comment explores legislative reaction to the emergence of postpartum depression as a defense in criminal cases 2 and
suggests alternative responses for handling this syndrome. 3
II.

History of the Syndrome

Postpartum depression is a broad term that covers a wide range
of symptoms, from weeping to psychotic reactions.' Most experts on
postpartum psychiatric disorders recognize three distinct types or
levels of illness: the "baby blues," postpartum depression, and postpartum psychosis.' 5 Approximately fifty to eighty percent of women
who give birth suffer from the "baby blues," a slight, temporary depression characterized by moodiness and tears.' 6 The blues usually
appear between the third and fifteenth day postpartum and clear up
in a few hours or days.' 7 Eight to twelve percent of new mothers

suffer a much more serious disturbance known as "postpartum depression."' 8 A woman affected with this illness experiences a much
deeper depression that can last several months.' 9 Postpartum depres-

sion is often marked by severe mood swings, loss of appetite, sleeplessness, thoughts of suicide, or of killing the baby.20 This illness usually appears after the twentieth day postpartum and progresses

slowly into a deep depression. 2 '
At the far end of the spectrum, a few women, perhaps one in
every thousand births, actually become psychotic and begin to suffer

from extreme agitation, hallucinations, or feelings of persecution. 2
They may become confused and delusional, exhibit bizarre behavior,
1I.See

infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 212-38 and accompanying text.
13. See Part VII, infra.
14. Griffiths, Postpartum Depression: Traditional Notions of Motherhood Have Kept
the Public in the Dark on Illness, The Patriot (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 9, 1989, at Cl, col. 1.
15. Toufexis, Why Mothers Kill Their Babies, TIME, June 20, 1988, at 81.
16. Id.
17. C. Dix, supra note 1,at 10.
18. Toufexis, supra note 15, at 81.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See C. Dix, supra note I, at 10.
22. Toufexis, supra note 15, at 81. Dr. Barbara Parry, a clinical psychiatrist at the
University of California, San Diego Medical School described women suffering from postpartum psychosis:
These people lose all touch with reality . . . .They start worrying that people
are out to get them or they have something foreign inside their bodies.- their
hearts are made of metal. They don't know what day it is. They don't recognize
things that should be familiar to them. One patient of mine had a baby girl but
she was convinced she had twin boys . . . . [Ilt comes and goes. Part of the day
they will be completely normal, then suddenly they will lose it all.
Fenly, supra note 5, at C4, col. 3.
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and become suicidal or violent.2" This disorder is known as "postpartum psychosis," although that term is not officially recognized by the
American psychiatric community.2" A small percentage of women
suffering postpartum psychosis will act on their impulses and will
hurt or kill their babies or themselves.2" It is important to differentiate between these three types of postpartum illnesses because only
postpartum psychosis produces the extreme psychotic reaction that
can justify an acquittal for murder. 6
Physicians recognized psychiatric illness following childbirth as
early as the fourth century, B.C., when Hippocrates described the
illness in the Third Book of Epidemics.2 7 French physician Louis V.
Marce also discussed this disorder in his 1858 treatise on madness
after childbirth. 28 Despite progress in understanding the causes of
23. J. Hamilton, Remarks at the Conference on Postpartum Depression and Criminal
Responsibility at the Pennsylvania State University I I (May 28, 1987) (copy on file in Dickinson Law Review office) [hereinafter Conference on Postpartum Depression]. Dr. Hamilton, a
San Francisco psychiatrist and clinical associate professor emeritus at Stanford University
Medical School, pioneered the study of postpartum psychiatric disorders in this country. He
recognizes three categories of severe postpartum illness: postpartum psychosis, postpartum depression, and postpartum psychotic depression.
Dr. Hamilton characterizes postpartum psychosis as an illness that begins in the first
three weeks after delivery and lasts from one week to several months. Id. Its symptoms are the
same as those described by Toufexis, supra note 15, for postpartum psychosis, but Dr. Hamilton notes that this syndrome is unique because of its "mercurial" quality: women who are
affected move from extreme psychotic thinking and behavior to apparent lucidity. Id.
Dr. Hamilton describes postpartum depression as deep depression with a later onset than
postpartum psychosis, usually after the twentieth day. Id. He distinguishes this syndrome from
psychosis by noting that it is less volatile and is often accompanied by physical symptoms. Id.
at 11-12.
The third syndrome recognized by Dr. Hamilton is a combination of the first two. Postpartum psychotic depression begins with an early agitated psychosis and moves gradually into
a deep depression. Id. Like postpartum psychosis, its victims may seem stable and then suddenly exhibit episodes of confusion and grossly abnormal thinking. Id. at 12. See also C. Dix,
supra note I, at 9-11.
24. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. Although the American medical and
psychiatric communities have virtually ignored this disorder, it has been recognized for centuries and is treated as a separate mental illness in England, Japan, and other countries. Pehrson, Postpartum Depression: The Hidden Pain After Childbirth, York (PA) Sunday News,
May 24, 1987, at El, col. 5.
25. Pehrson, supra note 24, at El, col. 5. Although a discussion of maternal suicide
following childbirth is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should be noted that it is not
unusual for a woman suffering from severe postpartum depression or psychosis to feel that
there is no other solution to her depression. See J. Hamilton, Progress in Postpartum Psychiatric Illness (April 2, 1987) (unpublished paper) (copy on file in Dickinson Law Review office).
Cf Murray v. St. Mary's Hosp., 280 A.D. 803, 113 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1952) (mem. opinion)
(action to recover damages for the death of decedent, who jumped from window of defendant
hospital while suffering from postpartum psychosis following delivery of a child).
26. Some courts have, however, acquitted women suffering from postpartum depression.
See, e.g., State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969).
27. C. Dix, supra note 1, at 37.
28. Ziporyn, 'Rip Van Winkle Period' Ends for Puerperal Psychiatric Problems, J.
A.M.A., Apr. 27, 1984, at 2061.
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postpartum psychiatric illness, early twentieth-century American
psychiatrists refused to recognize this research and directed that the
word "postpartum" and its synonyms be dropped from the nomen-

clature used for psychiatric illnesses. 29 For a time, research of psychiatric birth-related disorders virtually stopped.30 As a result, most
American medical professionals assumed that postpartum psychiatric illnesses did not exist."1 Although the American psychiatric community does not officially recognize postpartum psychosis as a dis-

tinct form of depression or psychosis,

2

interest in this area was

renewed in 1962 when Dr. James Hamilton3 3 published a book on
34
postpartum psychiatric problems.

The exact cause of postpartum psychiatric illness is not clear;
however, some researchers believe that it is a "biopsychosocial" illness. 5 This term implies that the illness is caused by the many bio-

chemical, emotional, psychological, and social changes a woman experiences following childbirth.3 6 Other experts believe that the
different types of postpartum psychiatric illness have different
causes. These experts assert that nonpsychotic postpartum depression
results from social factors and postpartum psychosis results from a
29. Hamilton, Introduction to C. Dix. THE NEW MOTHER SYNDROME at ix, x (1985).
30. Pehrson, Landmark Conference Looks at Postpartum Disorders, York (PA) Sunday
News, June 7, 1987, at E3, col. 2.
3 I. Id.
32. Toufexis, supra note 15, at 81. Postpartum psychosis is still not listed in the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (111), the bible of psychiatry. Dr.
Hamilton attributes this to a system of classification used by physicians and psychiatrists at
the turn of the century. At that time, diseases were named and classified according to the
organism or agency that caused them. Psychiatrists following this lead developed a system of
classifying mental illnesses based on the similarity of the symptoms. These professionals chose
to label all psychiatric illnesses that developed in the months after giving birth without reference to the act of childbearing. See Hamilton, supra note 29, at ix.
33. See supra note 23.
34. See J. HAMILTON. POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS (1962). In 1980 the University of Manchester (England) Department of Psychiatry hosted an international conference on
the psychopathology of reproduction. Following the conference, Dr. Hamilton and others
formed a group aimed at drawing attention to and coordinating research about postnatal
mental illnesses. The group is called the Marce Society, after nineteenth century French psychiatrist Louis Marce, who pioneered research in this field. Pehrson, supra note 24, at El, col.
5; Ziporyn, supra note 28, at 2061.
35. Griffiths, supra note 14, at C2.
36. Id. Following birth, there is a rapid and dramatic drop in a woman's reproductive
hormones. Just before delivery, a woman's levels of estrogen and progesterone are fifty times
higher than before pregnancy. Within hours of birth, the levels drop to below prepregnancy
levels. The levels of other hormones also change, causing mood swings. The strain caused by
this decreased hormone level is intensified by the changes a woman's body undergoes for milk
production. When combined with external stresses associated with childbirth, especially broken
sleep cycles, these pressures can overwhelm a new mother and can produce severe depression
or other psychological problems. See Pehrson, supra note 6, at E3. See also, C. Dix, supra
note I, at 19-24.
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genetic predisposition to mental illness.3 7 Both groups seem to agree,
however, that the best predictor of postpartum psychosis is previous
psychosis.38
III.

The Cases

A.

Early Cases

Although postpartum psychosis is generally touted as a "new"
defense, 9 the term was used in connection with a murder defense as
early as 1951.40 In People v. Skeoch,'" the Illinois Supreme Court
overturned Dorothy Skeoch's murder conviction despite her admission that she killed her six day old baby by tying a diaper around its
neck."2 The court ruled that the defendant's expert testimony regarding postpartum psychosis raised a reasonable doubt about her sanity
at the time of the crime."3
Almost twenty years later, another court also recognized that
severe postpartum depression may give rise to a viable insanity defense." The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. White,"5 affirmed that
Janet White's postpartum depression made her incapable of either
appreciating the criminality of her conduct or of controlling her actions when she killed her three month old child.'
In a 1979 Nevada case, however, the Nevada Supreme Court
upheld a trial court's ruling rejecting evidence of the syndrome.' 7
The court affirmed Pamela Sue Clark's conviction for the attempted
murder of her infant daughter, despite expert testimony that Clark's
severe postpartum depression "rendered her legally insane at the
37. Mansnerus, The Darker Side of the Baby Blues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1988, at C8,
col. 2. For an excellent analysis of the impact of biological and sociocultural factors on postpartum depression, see L. KRUCKMAN & C. ASMAN-FINCH. POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION. A RESEARCH GUIDE AND INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY (1986).
38. Mansnerus, supra note 37, at C8, col. 3. Dr. Michael W. O'Hara, an assistant professor of psychology at the University of Iowa, estimates that the incidence of postpartum
psychosis increases from one in one thousand in the general population to one in one hundred
if the woman has a family history of psychosis, and to one in five if the woman herself has
experienced a previous psychosis. Id.
39. See, e.g. Moss, Postpartum Psychosis Defense, New Defensive Measure for Mothers
Who Kill Infants, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. I, 1988, at 22; Trigoboff, Postpartum Blues: Cases Test Use
as Murder Defense, The L.A. Daily J., Dec. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
40. See People v. Skeoch, 408 Ill. 276, 280, 96 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1951).
41. 408 III. 276, 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951).
42. Id. at 277-78, 96 N.E.2d at 474.
43. Id. at 280, 96 N.E.2d at 475.
44. See State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 155, 456 P.2d at 799.
47. Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 588 P.2d 1027 (1979).

95

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING 1991

time of the crime." 48
B.

Recent Cases

As the early cases49 illustrate, courts differ in their reliance on
evidence of postpartum psychiatric disorders. As more women have
introduced this evidence, the disparity in court decisions has become
more pronounced. For example, of the thirteen cases discussed in
this Comment, courts acquitted seven women 50 and convicted six
others.51 Of those convicted, the charges ranged from involuntary
manslaughter 2 to first degree murder. 53 The sentences ranged from
55
a suspended sentence 54 to life imprisonment.

1. Acquittals.-In August, 1983, Angela Thompson of Sacra56
mento, California, drowned her nine-month-old son in a bathtub.
At the time, she was suffering from severe postpartum psychosis and
believed that her son was the devil.5 ' Thompson was charged with
first degree murder, but the charges were later reduced to manslaughter and felony child abuse. 58 Eventually, she was found not
guilty by reason of insanity. 59 Angela Thompson had suffered a similar bout of postpartum psychosis with an earlier pregnancy; that epi-

sode, however, ended not with a murder, but with a suicide
attempt.60
In another California case, a superior court judge overturned a
jury decision and declared Sheryl Lynn Massip not guilty by reason
of insanity in the death of her six-week-old son."1 Psychiatrists for
48. Id. at 27, 588 P.2d at 1029.
49. State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969); People v. Skeoch, 408 I11.
276,
96 N.E.2d 473 (1951); Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 588 P.2d 1027 (1979).
50. See infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
56. Japenga, Ordeal of Postpartum Psychosis, Illness Can Have Tragic Consequences
for New Mothers, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1987, Part VI, at I, col. 3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 10. After Thompson's first child was born, she suffered a severe case of postpartum psychosis, which included extreme agitation, hallucinations, religious obsession, and a
suicide attempt. Id. See also Jordan, Couple Seeks New Laws to Deal with Postpartum Depression, The L.A. Daily J.,Mar. 21, 1988, at 2,col. I.
61. People v. Massip, No. C-64690 (Orange Co. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1988). See also
Keller, Postpartum Psychosis Defense Leads Judge to Reverse Verdict, Crim. Prac. Man.
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both the prosecution and defense agreed that Massip was psychotic
when she drove a car over her son.62 Witnesses testified that Massip's personality changed dramatically after the birth of her son.6 3
In Vermont, another new mother suffering from severe postpartum psychosis shot her infant son, and then turned the gun on herself.64 Michele Remington was charged with first degree murder, but
after a "paper trial," Bennington District Court Judge Theodore
Mandeville found her not guilty by reason of insanity. 65 The court
further determined that by the time of trial, Remington had recovered from her postpartum psychosis and did not require hospitalization.66 The court did, however, order her to pursue out-patient
therapy.67
In yet another case, a Lincoln, Nebraska, woman drowned her
eight-day-old daughter in the kitchen sink.68 Just days before the
crime, Beverly Bartek's physician told her that she was suffering
from the baby blues.6 9 In fact, four psychiatrists later testified that
Bartek was suffering from postpartum psychosis.70 The court acquitted Bartek of the first degree murder charge, although she spent four
7 1
days in jail, and a month in a mental hospital.
The postpartum psychosis defense was also successfully used in
New York, when a former pediatric nurse was found not guilty by
reason of insanity of murdering two of her children and attempting
(BNA), at 3, Jan. I1, 1989. The jury rejected Massip's insanity defense, which was based on
postpartum psychosis. Id. The California Court of Appeals for the fourth district affirmed the
trial court's ruling. People v. Massip, 221 Cal. App. 3d 558, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1990). However, the California Supreme Court has granted reivew of this decision. People v. Massip, 274
Cal. Rptr. 369, 798 P.2d 1212 (1990).
62. Keller, supra note 61, at 4. Massip first threw her baby in front of an oncoming car,
and, when that failed, drove to an isolated spot, ran over him, and threw the body in a garbage
can. Id. See also Moss, supra note 39, at 22. In overruling the jury's verdict, the judge opined
that Massip was "clearly bonkers." Russell, supra note 7, at 10.
63. Keller, supra note 61, at 3. Witnesses testified that Massip changed from a "very
happy, excited, expectant mother to a severely depressed new mother." Id.
64. See State v. Remington, No. 587-4-87 Bcr (Vt. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1988);
65. State v. Remington, No. 587-4-87 Bcr, slip op. at 5 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1988).
The parties stipulated that Remington, who suffered severe postpartum psychosis, was legally
insane at the time of the act because she could not comprehend the criminality of her actions
'or conform her behavior to the requirements of the law. (Telephone interview with Mark J.
Keller, attorney for Michele Remington (Nov. 2, 1989)).
66. Telephone interview with Dr. Carl Burak, a psychiatrist who treated Michele Remington (Nov. 16, 1989). See also State v. Remington, No. 587-4-87 Bcr., slip op. at 5 (Vt.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1988).
67. State v. Remington, No. 587-4-487 Bcr., slip op. at 5 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1988).
68. See Toufexis, supra note 15, at 83.
69. Id.
70. Pehrson, supra note 30, at E3, col. 1.
71. Id.
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to murder the third.7 2 Ann Green admitted suffocating both her infant children with pillows shortly after their births in 1980 and
1982. 73 She attempted to suffocate her third child in August of
1985. 7" Green testified that she "shielded herself from the reality" of
the murders after doctors attributed the first death to a narrowing of
75
the aorta and the second to sudden infant death syndrome.
2. Convictions.-Courts have imposed a wide variety of
sentences in cases involving psychotic women convicted of murdering
their infant children. In one case, a West Virginia woman pleaded
guilty to involuntary manslaughter in the death of her infant daughter. 76 Kathleen Householder claimed that she suffered from postpartum psychosis when she killed her baby. 77 She spent twenty-two
months in jail.7 8
In another case, a Pennsylvania court rejected evidence of postpartum psychosis when it sentenced a woman to life imprisonment
for drowning her infant son. 79 Remarkably, both the prosecution and
defense experts agreed that Tanya Dacri was psychotic when she left
her infant son in a bathtub with running water.8 0 They disagreed,
however, over whether she had the mental capacity to form the specific intent necessary to support a first degree murder charge. 81 The
court determined that she did have the capacity, convicted her, and
82
sentenced her to life imprisonment.
Even in Pennsylvania, sentencing has been inconsistent. In
1984, a Bucks County, Pennsylvania court found Sharon Weisensale
guilty of third degree murder, but mentally ill, in the 1984 drowning
death of her two-month-old daughter.8 3 She was given a five year
suspended prison sentence and was required to undergo psychiatric
72. See Mansnerus, supra note 37, at CI, col. I.
73. Id. See also Zeldis, Postpartum Psychosis - A Rare Insanity Defense, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 19, 1988, at I, col. I.
74. Mansnerus, supra note 37, at Cl, col. I.
75. Zeldis, supra note 73, at 2, col. 3. It is not unusual for a woman suffering from
postpartum psychosis to delude herself into believing that someone or something else is responsible for the harm suffered by the baby. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
76. Trigoboff, supra note 39, at 24, col 2.
77. Id. The child died of head injuries and suffocation. Householder told police that she
might have killed the baby when she threw a rock at her children, who were sitting inside of
the family pickup truck. Id.
78. Russell, supra note 7, at 10.
79. Caba, Dacri is Sentenced to Life Term, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 14, 1989, at IA, col. I.
80. Id. at 8-A, col. 2.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Pehrson, supra note 6, at E3.
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treatment.8 4
In 1985, Sharon Comitz of Osceola Mills, Pennsylvania,
pleaded guilty but mentally ill to third degree murder for the drowning death of her month old son. 85 Despite testimony that Comitz was
being treated for severe postpartum depression at the time of the
murder, she received an eight to twenty year prison term. 86
In still another Pennsylvania case, a jury convicted Chanda
Smith of third degree murder in the drowning death of her threeweek-old daughter.8 7 Smith was sentenced to prison for five to ten
years.8 8 Experts testified that Smith, like Weisensale and Comitz,
murdered her child while suffering from severe postpartum psychosis. 89 Ironically, each woman was convicted of the same crime third degree murder - in the same state - Pennsylvania - yet
each received a different sentence.90
IV.

Postpartum Psychosis as a Defense

Should a woman who is charged with the death of her infant
child be excused from criminal responsibility because she suffered
from postpartum psychosis at the time of the incident? If convicted,
should she be given a light sentence because of her illness? Some
would say, unequivocally, yes:
The operation of the criminal law presupposes in the mind of the
person who is acted upon a normal state of strength, reflective
power, and so on, but a woman after child-birth is so upset, and
in such a hysterical state altogether that it seems to me you cannot deal with her in the same manner as if she was in a regular
and proper state of health.9 '
As noted above, some women have successfully defended
84. Russell. supra note 7, at 10.
85. See Commonwealth v. Comitz, 365 Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987). Comitz's
case has received much media attention. Comitz and her husband, Glenn, have appeared on
several national news and talk shows in an attempt to bring attention to this case, and to the
illness. Beelman, Centre Infanticide Case Has Role in PSU Parley, Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, Apr. 5, 1987, at B2, col. 1.
86. Comitz, 365 Pa. Super. at 602-04, 530 A.2d at 474-75.
87. Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 1775 Crim. Action 1984 (C.P. York County Ct. May
17, 1985).
88. Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 1775 Crim. Action 1984, slip op. at 8 (C.P. York
County Ct. May 17, 1985) (sentencing hearing on Oct. 28, 1985).
89. Pehrson, supra note 6, at E3, col. 1.
90. Id. This is perhaps most evident between Sharon Weisensale and Sharon Comitz,
who were each found guilty but mentally ill of third degree murder. Weisensale received probation, but Comitz received an eight to twenty year prison sentence. Id.
91. O'Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REv. 259 (May 1984)

(quoting 21 J. FITZJAMES

STEPHEN. BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS

291-92 (1866)).
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against murder charges by offering evidence of postpartum psychosis
in connection with a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.9" Others
have not been so fortunate. Some have offered evidence of the syndrome only to be found guilty but mentally ill and sentenced to long
periods of incarceration.9" In other circumstances, courts rejected ev-

idence 6f the syndrome outright and convicted the woman.9 4
Many obstacles impede the recognition of postpartum psychosis
as a defense to criminal homicide. Primarily, it is not fully accepted
as a distinct mental illness by the American medical and psychiatric
communities. 95 This in turn has hindered research, 9 which makes it
difficult for expert psychiatric witnesses to offer conclusive evidence
regarding the syndrome's causes and effects. 97 The illness's episodic

nature also makes it suspect.98 So too does its temporary duration,
because by trial time, the woman may have recovered from its ef-

fects. 99 This presents a scenario that is sometimes too convenient for

a jury to accept: a woman 'asks to be found not guilty because she
was "insane" at the time of the crime, but then claims she does not

require incarceration or commitment to a mental institution because
she has recovered.' 00

Some of the women afflicted with postpartum psychosis invent
stories to cover up their actions.' 0 ' The prosecution in these cases
often use the stories as evidence of premeditation. 2 Some experts
say, however, that denial is a symptom of postpartum psychosis, and
that some women concoct false stories to deny the reality of their
actions.' 0 1 This theory was substantiated in Commonwealth v.
92. See supra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Comitz, 365 Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987).
94. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. See Griffiths, supra note 14, at C2, col. 3.
98. See Russell, supra note 7, at 10, col. 4. One defense attorney described it this way:
Since it's hormonal, she can appear to be quite normal just before or after the
incident. That's exactly the kind of evidence the D.A. likes to use in court. There
may be no evidence of psychosis when she's examined, but she could have been
utterly insane for a half-hour period when she killed the baby. That's the characteristic of the illness.
Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Sharon Comitz, Kathleen Householder, Sheryl Lynn Massip and Chanda Smith all
reported that their children had been kidnapped. See Pietro, Man Whose Wife Killed Son
Spotlight Postpartum Decline, Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, Feb. 1, 1987, at E4, col. I
(Comitz); Trigoboff, supra note 39, at 24, col. 2 (Householder); Id. at 1, col. 4 (Massip):
Pehrson, supra note 6, at E3, col. I (Smith).
102. Trigoboff, supra note 39, at I, col. 4.
103. Id. at 24, col. 2. In his psychiatric evaluation of Sharon Comitz, the prosection's
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Comitz.'0 4 Sharon Comitz told police that her one-month-old son
had been kidnapped from her car, which was parked at a shopping
center." 8 Comitz was so convinced of her story that she passed two
lie detector tests.'0 6 Only later,
under hypnosis, could she recall what
07

she had done to her baby.1
Judges and juries may also hesitate to acquit a woman suffering
from postpartum psychosis because there is a natural tendency to
sympathize with the deceased infant. 0 8 This may be a particularly
significant factor in this era of heightened concern over child abuse
and abortion. Finally, as Dr. Daniel Maier-Katkin, head of the Department of Administration of Justice at the Pennsylvania State

University, noted:
We are dealing with a type of mental illness that men can't get,
and you come into a legal system that's sort of dominated by
men and they don't quite see that this could be a sort of mental
illness. They don't empathize with it. They can't imagine themselves in this situation. 10 9

Whether for these reasons or for others, most lawyers representing women in postpartum infanticide cases have declined to advocate
for a specialized defense based on postpartum psychosis. They have
chosen instead to work within the framework of existing defenses." 0
Peter Goldberger, a Philadelphia attorney who represented two
women suffering from postpartum psychosis, insists that postpartum

psychosis "is not a new defense, but simply a controversial diagnosis
expert, Dr. Martin T. Orne, noted that
[o]ne of the complicating factors in evaluating this situation was that the patient's behavior[,] subsequent to the drowning of the child, seemed to involve a
purposive [sic] effort to disguise her role in what happened to the child by claiming that the child was kidnapped. On the other hand, the efforts were neither
particularly subtle nor effective and are not really inconsistent with a dissociative
reaction.
Letter from Martin T. Orne, M.D., Ph.D., to Ray F. Gricar, Assistant District Attorney, Centre County, Pennsylvania (Oct. 12, 1985) (copy on file in Dickinson Law Review office).
104. 365 Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987).
105. Maier-Katkin, Postpartum Psychosis, Infanticide and the Law 15 CRIME. LAW
AND SOCIAL C14ANGE 110 (1991).

106.

Black & Karoll, Infanticide, Is the Law Too Tough on Mothers Who Kill?, Wo1986, at 6, 7.
107. Id. at 7. Lianne Scherr, Sharon Comitz's social worker, explained, "'Underextreme
stress, people can forget who they are and have no conscious control over their actions." Id.
108. Berg, Postpartum Psychosis Defense Gaining, San Francisco Banner Daily J., Oct.
7, 1988, at 5, col. I. As one University of Southern California law professor noted, "The image
of the helpless baby is going to overwhelm everything." Id.
109. Beelman, supra note 85, at B2, col. 4.
110. Most women charged with infanticide offer evidence of postpartum psychosis in
connection with an insanity plea and not as a separate defense. See supra notes 39-90 and
MAN'S WORLD, Sept. 9,

accompanying text.
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which may or may not give rise to a standard criminal defense, depending on the particular circumstances of the case." 11' 1 Thomas

Borris, an Orange County, California deputy district attorney,
agrees. He believes that postpartum psychosis is "part of the existing
insanity or diminished capacity defense." ' 2

There is, however, no single insanity defense. Different states
choose different legal standards for insanity; thus, a person who is
declared insane in one jurisdiction may not meet the test in another
jurisdiction. The following section is an examination of five types of
insanity laws generally found in the United States, and a discussion
of the guilty but mentally ill verdict and the diminished capacity
defense. The different formulations used by the various courts may
explain why women who have killed their infant children while suffering from postpartum psychosis have received disparate verdicts.
V.

The Insanity Defenses

Generally, an insanity defense excuses a defendant's criminal
conduct when the defendant had a mental defect or disability at the
time of the crime that contributed in some way to the illegal behavior.1 13 It is a complete defense: a defendant who is successful in asserting this defense will be acquitted of the crime. 4 Courts, however, presume that all defendants are sane; hence, the burden rests

on the defendant to come forward with some evidence that casts
doubt on his sanity." 5 After the defendant comes forward with some
evidence, the burden to convince the jury of the defendant's sanity

may shift to the prosecution."
The premise of the insanity defense is that a defendant should

not be held responsible for criminal conduct unaccompanied by a
blameworthy state of mind.11 7 Nor should a defendant be punished
for the inability to control his actions, even if he knew that his acI11.Telephone interview with Peter Goldberger, Esquire (Nov. 9, 1989). See also Russell, supra note 7, at 12, cols. 2-4.
112. Trigoboff, supra note 39, at I, col. 4.
113. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.1(a) (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOTT].
114. It is true, however, that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is usually
followed by commitment to a mental institution rather than acquittal and unchecked release.
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.1, at 304. The scope of this Comment will not permit a
discussion of postacquittal commitment. For an analysis of the current law in this area, see
Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 961 (1986).
115.

LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.5, at 342.

116. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03 (1962) (burden of proof on defendant to
show mental disease or defect).
117. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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tions were wrong. 18 The justification for this defense is that convic-

tion of an "insane" person would not serve the purposes of criminal
law. 11 9 There has been much debate, however, over what constitutes

"insanity". 20 Over the years, several different "tests" for insanity
have emerged. The following is a brief overview of these different
tests and their relation to postpartum psychosis.
A.

M'Naghten

The M'Naghten rule'
developed in 1843 after Daniel
M'Naghten was acquitted .of the attempted assassination of British
Prime Minister Robert Peel.' 2 2 The defense demonstrated that
M'Naghten suffered from delusions that caused him to commit the
murder.1 23 This test, also known as the "right-wrong" test, is the
traditional test for insanity.' 2 4 Under the M'Naghten rule, a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the crime,
"the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong."125
The M'Naghten rule is perhaps the most difficult insanity test
for a woman suffering from postpartum psychosis. 2 It requires a
woman first to show that she suffered from a disease or defect of the
mind. 2 7 Because postpartum psychosis is not officially recognized,' 28
118. This is known as the "irresistible impulse" test. See Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577,
2 So. 854 (1887).
119. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.1(c), at 306-08.
120. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 114. " 'Rivers of ink, mountains of printer's lead, forests
of paper have been expended' debating 'the volition prong' and 'the cognitive prong' of the
defense of insanity and relative merits of insanity as an affirmative defense.
... Id. at 962
(quoting Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 516
(1968)).
121. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
122. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.2(a), at 311. M'Naghten mistakenly shot
and killed Edward Drummond, Peel's private secretary. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 4.2, at 310. The authors of this treatise break down the elements of the test in
this fashion:
(I) (disability) that the accused have suffered a defect of reason, from a
disease of the mind; and
(2) (result) that consequently at the time of the act he did not know
(a) the nature and quality of the act, or
(b) that the act wai wrong.
See id. § 4.2(a) at 311.
126. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 588 P.2d 1027 (1979): Commonwealth v.
Comitz, 365 Pa. Super. 599, 520 A.2d 473 (1987). Courts in Pennsylvania and Nevada adhere
to the M'Naghten test for insanity.
127. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.2(2), at 311.
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this often requires pitting one psychiatrist's opinion against another's. If a woman can demonstrate that she was actually psychotic,
however, she should meet this element of the test. 2 9
Next, the woman must show that she did not know either the
nature and quality of the act, or that the act was wrong.1 30 A woman
will probably succeed in meeting this element if she can demonstrate
that she was delusional, heard voices, or believed that her child was
evil.13 1 If a woman killed her child to get rid of its supposed evil
influence, she could meet this requirement because the act of eradicating evil would seem right, not wrong. For example, in 1983, Angela Thompson drowned her son after hearing the voice of God tell
her that the child was the devil.' 32 She explained "I thought if I
killed the baby that my husband would raise him to life again in
three days and that the world would know that my husband was
Jesus Christ. When he (the baby) was dead, I thought his face was
contorted like the devil's."1 33 To Thompson, in her delusional state,
the murder must have seemed to be the very essence of what was
right.
A woman who suffers from postpartum psychosis, but who is
not delusional, will have more difficulty winning a not guilty verdict
under the M'Naghten Rule. For example, a woman who knows what
she is doing, but does not know why she is doing it," 4 or who cannot
stop herself from doing it, may be unable to demonstrate that she
lacked knowledge of the "nature and quality" or wrongfulness of the
act.1 35 It does not follow, though, that such a woman should be stigmatized and sentenced as a murderer, since she may not have pos1 36
sessed any criminal intent, a necessary element of the crime.
128. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
129. But see Goldstein, The Psychiatrist's Guide to Right and Wrong: Part II1: Postpartum Depression and the "Appreciation" of Wrongfulness, 17 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 121 (1989). "Psychosis, even in its most extreme forms, may not destroy the minimal
awareness required by M'Naghten." Id. at 123.
130. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.2. at 311.
131. See Zeldis, supra note 73, at 1, col. 2.
132. Toufexis, supra note 15, at 81.
133. Id.
134. This distinction is important. Dr. Daniel Maier-Katkin notes that it is common for
women suffering from postpartum depression to know what they are doing when they kill their
babies, but not to know why they are doing it. See McLaughlin, Child Killers Agree to Aid
PSU Study of Postpartum Depression, Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, June 15, 1986, at
B4, col. 5.
135. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.2(a), at 311.
136. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.1(b), at 306. This issue was crucial in
Tanya Dacri's case because experts for both the prosecution and defense agreed tha Dacri had
a mental disorder, but disagreed about its effect on her ability to form criminal intent. Caba,
Dacri Decision Hinges on Intent, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 13, 1989 at I-B, col. 2-3.
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The M'Naghten test, though widely used, has sustained considerable criticism. A primary criticism has been that the M'Naghten
rule focuses only on a defendant's cognitive state,13 7 and ignores
questions of a defendant's volition.13 8 In particular, it ignores those

instances in which a defendant understands the nature of his actions,
but is unable to control them.' 39 As a result of this concern, many
40
jurisdictions have rejected or modified the M'Naghten test.'
B.

The Irresistible Impulse Test

One of the modifications adopted to supplement the M'Naghten
rule's cognitive test is the irresistible impulse test.' 4 ' The irresistible
impulse test is premised on the belief that criminal responsibility requires both the cognitive ability to determine right from wrong, and
the power to choose between them. 42 This test, defined in Parsons v.
State,4 3 declares a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity if he
was afflicted with a defect or disease of mind and did not know
whether the act in question was right or wrong. " " The test also excuses a defendant if he did know right from wrong, but, because of
the mental disease, lacked the power to choose between them. 4 5 The
criminal action, however, must have been a product of the mental
4
disease.
Some commentators have suggested that this test is too stringent because it implies that the defendant's action must be sudden
137. "Cognition" is defined as "[t]he act of clearly and correctly apprehending fact or
truth, whether mediately or immediately ...." NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 517 (Flint & Wagnalls ed. 1941).
138. Volition is defined as -[t] he act or faculty of willing; exercise of the will, especially,
the termination of a process of deliberation or vacillation of purpose by a decision or choice."
NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2663 (Flint & Wagnalls ed. 1941).
139. See Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970). The court in Parsons v.
State posed this question:
Can the courts justly say . . . that the only test or rule of responsibility in criminal cases is the power to distinguish right from wrong . . .Or may there not be
insane persons, of a diseased brain, who, while capable of perceiving the difference between right and wrong, are . . .so far under the duress of such disease
as to destroy the power to choose between right and wrong?
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 584-85, 2 So. 854, 859 (1887) (emphasis in original).
140. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887); State v. White, 93 Idaho
153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969).
141. See Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
142. See id. at 585, 2 So. at 859.
143. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
144. Id. at 596, 2 So. at 866.
145. Id. at 597, 2 So. at 866.
146. Id. Professor LaFave notes, however, that most states do not require the uncontrolled action to have been the sole product of the mental disease. LAFAVI & SCOTT, supra
note 113, § 4.2(d), at 321 n.104.
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and without deliberation. 47 Most courts,. however, have interpreted
the rule to require only that the defendant be unable to resist doing
wrong. 4 8 Thus, under this interpretation of the irresistible impluse
test, a victim of postpartum psychosis could escape conviction by
proving one of two things: She could not distinguish right from
wrong because of the psychosis, or she could not prevent herself from
committing the act, even though she knew what she was doing and
14 9
knew that itwas wrong.
Difficulty in applying the irresistible impulse insanity defense
has caused some jurisdictions to reject it. Distinguishing between
compulsion and inclination can be troublesome. As one commentator
noted, "[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not
resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and
dusk." 1 50 Ultimately, under this test, the jury will have to decide if
the woman was really compelled to do the act or if she was simply
unwilling to control her behavior.
C.

The Product Test

The product test, also known as the Durham"' or New Hampshire rule, 152 was first adopted in 1869 when New Hampshire rejected the M'Naghten test for one in which the defendant would be
found not guilty by reason of insanity if his crime "was the offspring
or product of mental disease."' 3 This decision reflected advancements in psychiatry that recognized that "[t]he right-wrong test,
which considers knowledge or reason alone, is . . .an inadequate
guide to mental responsibility for criminal behavior."' 54 However, it
was eighty-three years before any other American jurisdiction
adopted the New Hampshire rule.'
147. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (rejecting
the irresistible impulse test because it "gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by
brooding and reflection . . ."Id.
148. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.2(d), at 321.
149. The Illinois Supreme Court employed this interpretation of the test when it reversed Dorothy Skeoch's murder conviction. People v. Skeoch, 408 111.
276, 96 N.E.2d 473
(1951). The court noted that expert testimony of Skeoch's postpartum psychosis at the time of
the murder raised sufficient doubt about her ability to distinguish and choose between right
and wrong. Id. at 280, 96 N.E.2d at 475 (emphasis added).
150. Ellis, supra note 114, at 962 n.5 (quoting American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense (Dec. 1982), reprinted in IssuEs IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 7, 16
(1984)).
151. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
152. See State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
153. Id. at 408.
154. Durham, 214 F.2d at 871.
155. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.3(a), at 324.
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The product test gained national attention in 1954 when the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals adopted it in Durham
v. United States.'5 6 The court acknowledged that its new test was
broader than the M'Naghten Rule and the irresistible impulse test.

It stated that the product test "is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental dis157
ease or mental defect."'
The court rather generally defined "disease" as a condition that
is capable of either improving or deteriorating. 158 It defined "defect"
as a condition that is not believed to be capable of improving or deteriorating, and that may be hereditary or the result of an injury or
disease. 159 It did not, however, define "product."' 0

A woman who killed her child while in the throes of postpartum
psychosis would have a greater chance of being found not guilty by
reason of insanity under this very broad test than under either of the
earlier tests.' 6 ' An active psychosis, marked by paranoia or delu-

sions, is clearly a mental disease or defect, even under the rudimentary definition provided by Durham."2 This test is so broad, however, that it would also protect a woman with only a mild case of
baby blues because that condition is "capable of either improving or
deteriorating.""6 '
Although defense counsel in other jurisdictions endeavored to
have the broad Durham rule accepted, it was not adopted by any
other court."' In 1972, even the D.C. Circuit court abandoned the
65
rule in United States v. Brawner.
156. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court of appeals overruled the Durham decision nearly twenty years later. The court in that case noted that "[flew cases have evoked as
much comment as Durham." United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
157. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75.
158. Id. at 875.
159. Id. In a later decision, the court provided a legal definition of mental disease or
defect. See McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The McDonald
Court held that "the jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." Id.
160. But see Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In this case the
District of Columbia appellate court revisited the Durham rule, and defined the word "product". The court gave "product" a but-for test of causation: "[Tihe act would not have been
committed if the person had not been suffering from the disease." Id. at 615-16. See also
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.3. at 323.
161. See supra notes 121-25 for a discussion of the M'Naghten Rule. See also supra
notes 142-49 for a discussion of the irresistible impulse test.
162. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
163. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
164. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.3(b), at 326. The product test, however,
remains the law in New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 628:2 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
165. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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The Model Penal Code

In Brawner, the D.C. Circuit adopted the American Law Institute's (ALI) test for legal insanity.' 8 The ALI's proposal is found in
Article 4 of the Model Penal Code (MPC). 1 7 This test has become
"the dominant force in the law pertaining to the defense of insanity."' 8 Nearly all of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals"8 9 and a significant minority of states 170 have adopted this test.
Under the ALl/Model Penal Code proposal, a defendant is not responsible for his criminal conduct if he has a "less than substantial
capacity" to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his behavior to what is right.'7
The explanatory note to MPC section 4.01 specifies that under
this section an individual's failure to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct may include a lack of awareness of what he is doing, a misunderstanding of material circumstances, or a failure to understand
the significance of his actions in some deeper sense.' 7 2 Like the irresistible impulse test, MPC section 4.01 also addresses the issue of
volition.' 73 This section excuses a defendant's criminal conduct if, as
a result of his mental disease or defect, he "lack[s] substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."' 7 "
Subsection two of the Model Penal Code test is unique because it
deliberately excludes a person whose abnormality is revealed only
through repeated criminal or antisocial conduct. 17 5 This paragraph
was included to prevent psychopaths from using the ALl/Model Pe76
nal Code test to escape criminal responsibility.
The ALl/Model Penal Code test provides a woman suffering
postpartum psychosis with a convenient framework for a not guilty
166. Id. at 973.
167. Section 4.01, entitled Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility, provides:
(1)A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985).
168. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 979.
169. Id. at 979. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.3(e), at 331.
170. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.3(e), at 331.
171. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 explanatory note (1985).
172. Id.
173. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 explanatory note (1985).
175. Id. § 4.01(2) (1962).
176. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.3(e)(2), at 331.
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by reason of insanity plea. This definition combines both the
M'Naghten Rule and the irresistible impulse test, 177 therefore, a woman could show either that she was delusional and could not appreciate the wrongfulness (nature and quality) of her acts, or that her
psychosis prevented her from controlling her acts.' 78 This was the
approach adopted by the Idaho court in State v. White.1 79 The court
favored the ALl/Model Penal Code test over the M'Naghten test
because the ALl test considers a defendant's ability to control his
conduct, as well as his ability to appreciate its criminality.1 8 In
White, experts for both sides agreed that Janet White's postpartum
depression rendered her incapable of "conforming her conduct to the
requirements of the law," ' ' which is an element of the ALl/Model
Penal Code test. 8 2 Thus, the Court acquitted Janet White of the
charges against her.
A person excused from criminal responsibility under the ALl/
Model Penal Code test is not automatically released, however. Instead, the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene is ordered to place a
defendant acquitted under this section "in an appropriate institution
' 83
for custody, care and treatment.'
It is important to remember that the Model Penal Code test will
not exculpate child abusers or habitually violent persons because the
test excludes from the terms "mental disease or defect" those persons who commit repeated acts of violence or criminal behavior.' 8
Thus, this test should placate those people who fear that a defense
based on postpartum psychosis will allow child abusers to go unpunished. This test is not a panacea for all women who kill their children. Only those women actually suffering from postpartum psychosis will be acquitted of their crimes. Further, even those acquitted
will be institutionalized because the Model Penal Code mandates automatic commitment to a mental hospital.' 85
E.

The Federal Test
Despite the success enjoyed by the ALl/Model Penal Code

177.
178.
infanticide
179.
180.
181.
182.

183.
184.

185.

See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
For an interesting analysis of the application of the ALl/Model Penal Code test to
cases involving postpartum depression, see Goldstein, supra note 129.
93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969).
See id. at 158, 456 P.2d at 802.
Id. at 155, 456 P.2d at 799.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 explanatory note (1985).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(I) (1962).
Id. § 4.01(2).
See id. § 4.08.
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test,18 6 Congress discarded it in 1984 in favor of a narrower,
M'Naghten-type rule.1 87 This new test not only abandons the volition
element of the insanity defense, 88 but also shifts the burden of
proof, requiring the defendant to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence. 88
Because the new law is a federal law, states are not required to
adopt this approach, but instead may choose to use it as a model for
state law. Many states are hearing the public outcry against broader
insanity defenses, however, and it is likely that some will enact narrower, M'Naghten-type tests.'
Because the federal law is so similar to the right-wrong test espoused by M'Naghten, the liabilities inherent in that test are also a
problem."' A woman will have difficulty securing an acquittal based
on postpartum psychosis in jurisdictions enacting this narrow rule
because she will have to demonstrate that her psychosis prevented
her from understanding that murder is wrong. Therefore, even if a
woman is delusional and heard voices commanding her to kill her
child, she would still be "sane" under this test if she understood that
murder was wrong.
F. Guilty but Mentally Ill

Disenchantment with insanity defenses generally19 2 has led a
186. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.3(e), at 330.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. 1989). This section provides:
(a) Affirmative defense - It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any
Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the
offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental
disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of proof - The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of
insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id.
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (Supp. 1989).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (Supp. 1989). Congress enacted this rule largely as a result of
public dissatisfaction over the disposition in the John Hinckley case. See United States v.
Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. June 21, 1982). John Hinckley was found not guilty by
reason of insanity of the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan. See generally
Hans and Slater, John W. Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public's Verdict, 47
PUB. OPINION Q. 202 (1983); Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH L.
REv. 528 (1985).
190. See Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should
Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 494, 494-95 (noting that three states have abolished
the insanity defense entirely and that others either have adopted stricter, M'Naghten-style
tests, shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, or adopted guilty but mentally ill verdicts).
See also Wexler, supra note 189; Ellis, supra note 114.
191. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
192. "ITihe feeling of many people [is] that when you were calling somebody 'not guilty
by reason of insanity' you were saying that they did not do something wrong. The response
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number of states to enact a guilty but mentally ill verdict in addition
to the guilty, not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity verdicts
9
usually available.9'
Typically, if a defendant pleads not guilty by
reason of insanity, but the jury believes he is guilty, the statute
would allow the jury to find him guilty but mentally ill. 9 " If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill, the court may sentence him
as if he were found guilty of the offense. 195 The difference between
the guilty and guilty but mentally ill verdicts is that a defendant who
is found guilty but mentally ill will be evaluated before sentencing,
and appropriate mental health services will be provided during
incarceration. 196
Those who support the guilty but mentally ill verdict see it as a
compromise between expanding the insanity defense and abolishing
it altogether. 1 97 Others, however, believe that it offers little to the
98
defendant or to society.1
If a woman suffering from postpartum psychosis is charged with
the murder of her infant, she should consider the wisdom of accepting a guilty but mentally ill plea because it may result in a long
prison sentence or commitment to a mental institution. This plea is
inappropriate for victims of postpartum psychosis since these women
are psychotic and "a danger" only during the postpartum period;
hence, they do not require incarceration or long term treatment for
99
their mental illness.'
Sharon Comitz's guilty but mentally ill plea demonstrates the
harsh results that are possible with this plea. °0 Comitz pleaded
guilty but mentally ill to third degree murder and received an eightto-twenty year prison term. 201 Comitz suffered severe postpartum depression after giving birth to each of her children, 20 2 but had no
very often is, 'but he did it . . . How can you say [he is] not guilty . . .?"" Wexler, supra
note 189, at 540 n. 74 (quoting testimony of Professor Zenoff before the National Commission
on the Insanity Defense (1983)).
193. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note H 3, § 4.5(h), at 359; Slobogin, supra
note 190.
194. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36 (1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315
(Purdon 1983). See also Slobogin, supra note 190, at 495.
195. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.5(h), at 359.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill. A Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 DICK. L. REV. 289, 309 (1981).
198. See generally Slobogin, supra note 194.
199. See Maier-Katkin, supra note 105, at 31 (discussing the futility of incarcerating
women in postpartum psychosis cases).
200. See Commonwealth v. Comitz, 365 Pa. Super. 599, 530 A.2d 473 (1987).
201. Id. at 602, 530 A.2d at 474.
202. Id. at 602-03. 530 A.2d at 474.

95

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING 1991

other history of mental illness or violence. Her long sentence improperly suggests, however, either a need to protect society, which is not
supported by her birth-related crime or prior history, or a need to
punish her, which is inconsistent with the government's acceptance
of her mental illness.
G. Diminished Capacity
The diminished capacity, or partial responsibility, defense, like
the guilty but mentally ill verdict, is an alternative plea when a defendant suffers from an abnormal mental condition that does not rise
to the level of legal insanity.20 3 It is more attractive than a guilty but
mentally ill defense, though, because it allows a jury to convict a
defendant of a lesser offense if the jury believes that the defendant
lacked the requisite state of mind for the charged offense.2 °4
In jurisdictions in which the insanity defense has been abolished, 20 5 evidence of a mental abnormality can be admitted to abrogate the existence of mens rea. 206 In other jurisdictions, the diminished capacity defense limits evidence of a mental abnormality to
negate only specific elements of first degree murder such as premeditation or deliberation. 20 7 For a woman suffering from postpartum
psychosis, this may be an especially appropriate defense since she
may have been unable to form criminal intent. 208 At least two English women have successfully asserted this defense in cases involving premenstrual syndrome. 09
VI.
A.

Legislative Responses to Postpartum Depression and Psychosis
The English Law

England first criminalized infanticide, the murder of an infant
soon after its birth,21 0 in 1623.211 The English statute made it a
crime for an unmarried woman to conceal the death of her bastard
child.21 2 In 1803, the statute was repealed and replaced by one that
203. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.7, at 368.
204. See id. § 4.7(a).
205. Montana, Idaho, and Utah have abolished the defense of insanity. Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, 139 RUTGERS L. REv. 289, 303 (1987).
206. Wexler, supra note 189, at 530. Mens rea is defined as -[a] guilty mind; a guilty or
wrongful purpose; a criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979).
207. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 113, § 4.7(b), at 370.
208. Conference on Postpartum Depression, supra note 23.
209. Tybor, Women on Trial: A New Defense, 4 NAT'I L.J. I, 16 (Feb. 15, 1982).
210.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (5th ed. 1979).

211.
212.

21 Jac. I, ch. 27 (1623).
See O'Donovan, supra note 91, at 259..
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equated infanticide with homicide.2 13 It was not until the twentieth
century, however, that British lawmakers considered the effects of
birth on a woman's psyche. The British Infanticide Act of 1922 reduced the crime of infanticide from murder to manslaughter when a
mother caused the death of her "newly-born child" by a willful act
or omission if, at the time of the crime, the balance of her mind was
disturbed by reason of the birth.2""
The 1922 Act was repealed and re-enacted in 1938.215 The 1938
Act declares that a woman who causes the death of her child by a
willful act or omission, while the child is less than one year old, is
guilty of infanticide if, at the time of the act, her mind was "disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of
giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child. 21 The crime is a felony, but carries the same punishment as manslaughter, a lesser charge than
murder.21 7 Canada also has an infanticide statute,2 18 which was
modeled after this Act. 2 9
The English act acknowledges that postpartum psychiatric illness can influence a woman's behavior in such a way as to reduce
criminal responsibility.22 ' Britain's understanding and treatment of
postpartum psychosis does not result in merely a reduced penalty for
infanticide, however. Dr. Channi Kumar, a professor at the University of London's Institute of Psychiatry, notes that in England the
trend is to treat postpartum psychosis as an illness, not as a criminal
matter. 221 Since 1976, none of the sixty-one English women found
guilty of infanticide have gone to prison. 2 2 Usually, they are sent to
hospitals or given probation.223
213.

Id. at 260.

214. Id. at 261.
215. Infanticide Act 1938, 1&2 Geo. 6, ch. 36.
216. Id. § 1(l).
217. Id. See also Japenga, supra note 56, at 1,cols. 2-3.
218. CAN. REV, STAT. ch. C-46, § 23 (1953). This act declares that a woman convicted
of infanticide cannot be imprisoned for more than five years. Id. at § 237.
219. For a discussion of this act, see Arboleda-Florez, Infanticide. Some Medico Legal
Considerations, 20 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRIC Assoc. J. 55 (1975). Dr. Arboleda-Florez recommends that Canada abolish its infanticide statute. He suggests that treating infanticide as a
separate offense can result in discrimination. The act applies to the death of an infant less than
twelve months old. Dr. Arboleda-Florez notes that this arbitrary age would allow some women
to escape murder charges for the premeditated death of their infant child, while women who
truly suffer postpartum psychosis beyond the first year of the child's life would not be able to
avail themselves of the act. Id. at 58.
220. O'Donovan, supra note 91, at 262.
221. Pehrson, supra note 30, at E3. col. 4.
222. Cooke, In Britain, the Law is More Lenient, WOMAN'S WORLD, Sept. 9, 1986, at 6.
223. Id.
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Efforts in the United States

Although no state in this country has passed an infanticide statute, California lawmakers have addressed postpartum psychosis in
legislation. Several years ago, California Senator Robert Presley
formed a task force to study ways to identify victims of postpartum
depression in child abuse and infanticide cases.22 ' The members included law enforcement officials, researchers, and specialists in the
treatment of postpartum psychosis.22 The task force made recommendations for legislation, and on July 20, 1989, the California state
legislature approved two resolutions addressing postpartum
psychosis.22
The propsed law made several assertions about the history and
nature of postpartum psychosis, and requested that the California
Board of Corrections adopt regulations outlining a procedure for law
enforcement officers to use when assessing the mental state of a new
mother charged with certain crimes, especially infanticide.2 27 A woman accused of one of these crimes would be screened during the jail
intake process.2 28 If the assessment indicated that the woman could
be suffering from postpartum psychosis, she would be referred to a
mental health facility for further evaluation.22 9 The resolution further requested that the University of California research postpartum
psychosis. 230 A separate but similar resolution approved by the California Senate requested that the California Commission on Peace
Officers Standards and Training include in its basic training course
standards for the recognition and handling of women who may be
231
suffering from postpartum psychosis.
The California legislation was supported by the California
Peace Officers' Association, the California State Sheriffs' Association and the California Police Chiefs' Association. 3 2 Support for the
legislation was not universal, however. At least one district attorney
opposed the legislation, calling it ill-advised 33 The district attorney
224. Jordan, supra note 60, at 2.
225. Press Release, Sen. Robert Presley (July 20, 1989).
226. Id.
227. S. Con. Res. 23 (Cal. 1989).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. S. Con. Res. 39 (Cal. 1989).
232. Letter from Alva Cooper, Legislative Advocate, California Peace Officers' Association, to Senator Robert Presley (Jan. 6, 1987) (copy on file in Dickinson Law Review office).
233. Letter from Grover C. Trask II, District Attorney, Riverside County (California),
to Senator Robert C. Presley (Jan. 13, 1987) (copy on file in Dickinson Law Review office).
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felt that it was unnecessary to distinguish one particular type of depression or psychosis from all others that could affect a defendant's
mental state. He also stated that it was demeaning to women, since
it implied that they, as a class, were not "responsible, accountable,
equal human beings because of hormonal differences from men. 2 3 4
Others have also voiced concern over the emphasis of biological
differences and its effects on the way woman are treated in our society.23 5 One must wonder if using biologically oriented disorders such
as postpartum psychosis and premenstrual syndrome as criminal defenses encourages unequal treatment of women since it suggests that
women should not be held as accountable for their actions as men,
simply because of their biological differences.
Although California is the only state to have adopted legislation
addressing postpartum psychosis, it is not the only state to have examined the disorder. In 1987, a Pennsylvania legislator, Representative Allen G. Kukovich, also introduced a resolution seeking a study
of postpartum depression. 23 6 This resolution would have required the
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency to conduct a
study of postpartum depression and report its findings to the Pennsylvania General Assembly.2 37 The Resolution was referred to a
House Committee, but was never considered by the full chamber.
Although legislation would certainly assure victims of postpartum psychosis of less disparate treatment, it does pose some other
problems. Primarily, disagreement within the medical community
about the causes and effects of postpartum psychosis make policy
formation difficult. Furthermore, if postpartum psychosis is merely a
form of insanity, as some critics suggest,23 8 then it may be inappropriate to redress the disparity through separate legislation. Finally,
in an era in which both politicians and the public want to be "tough
on crime," it is unlikely that there would be widespread support for
a measure that would reduce penalties for women who kill their
children.
VII.

Conclusion

Postpartum psychosis is a complex mental disorder that affects
some women's mental processes after giving birth. Although its victims are few, the consequences can be deadly. It is tragic when a
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
See O'Donovan, supra note 91, at 259, 264.
H.R. Res. 115, 171st Leg., IstSess. (1987).
Id.
See supra notes 111-12, 235-36 and accompanying text.
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woman suffering from postpartum psychosis kills her child, but the
tragedy is compounded when that woman is imprisoned for her action. A basic tenet of our justice system is that sick people should be
helped, not punished, for behavior they could not control or under-,
stand, and a woman suffering from postpartum psychosis is most assuredly sick.
Postpartum psychosis can be classified as temporary insanity,
but the various insanity statutes lead to disparate results in similar
cases. To prevent this injustice, it is necessary to address postpartum
psychosis separately, perhaps by statute. However, this course of action may not be appropriate. If postpartum psychosis is, in fact, just
a form of insanity, then it should not be distinguished from other
mental disorders. A better way to address the disparate and harsh
treatment of these women is to educate the judiciary and the public
about this disorder. If judges and juries understand and accept this
illness, they may be more sympathetic to women who are tortured by
postpartum psychosis and its deadly effects, and less likely to impose
harsh punishments.
Perhaps the best way to address postpartum psychosis is not
through the criminal justice system at all, but to encourage research
into its causes and treatment. If women are identified and treated
throughout pregnancy and the postpartum period, we may be able to
prevent tragedies like those discussed in this Comment. That would
be the most just result of all.
Amy L. Nelson

